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I. INTRODUCTION
Few matters of criminal jurisprudence trigger so many diverse
visceral reactions as the use in a trial of evidence of a defendant's crim-
inal background. Persuasive arguments have supported the proposition
* B.S., St. Louis University, LL.B., St. Louis University Law School; Partner, Arent,
Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, D.C.
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that a criminal defendant's record ought to be available both to a trier of
fact and to a sentencing judge so that the general character of the man on
trial can be evaluated in light of the charge. At least equally persuasive,
however, are the arguments that are being heard with increasing frequency
that an unrelated prior offense has no legitimate place in the methodology
of proof of a specific offense in a criminal trial and that evidence of a
previous crime is so prejudicial that it makes a fair trial on the present
charge all but impossible.
Of even greater interest to the legal profession is the variety of con-
stitutional protections upon which the use of prior crimes evidence might
also impinge. Those constitutional provisions and related concepts of
near constitutional stature are surprisingly varied as revealed by recent
decisions. The evidentiary rules traditionally relied upon for admitting
or excluding evidence of prior offenses have been found to be mechanical,
vulnerable and subject to great potential for abuse. In any given case
the defense can muster a series of precedents supporting the argument
that the prior crime in question is too prejudicial and unrelated to permit
its use as evidence. But the prosecution, too, can always find precedents
that provide at least an evidentiary basis for admitting even the most
highly prejudicial evidence of prior offenses. The result of such ambivalent
rules of evidence is that they seem to have failed to generate uniform sup-
port for any single set of criteria by which to evaluate prior offenses
evidence. The extremes-complete admissibility or complete exclusion-
have little support from the courts, but both have been advocated by
factions of the Advisory Committee drafting the proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence.' Current decisions reveal serious divisiveness over such
basic questions as whether the starting point should be an exclusionary
rule, and whether the evidence of an unrelated prior crime can be used
to prove an element of the offense, including even the corpus delicti of a
murder charge.2
The appellate courts, reacting strongly to the introduction of prior
crimes evidence in a case, have turned increasingly to constitutional con-
siderations in fashioning a resolution. Rarely today do courts base their
decisions as to the admissibility of prior crimes evidence on mechanical
rules of recentness, similarity to the charge or relationship to credibility.
Instead, decisions are frequently based upon the fifth amendment due
process clause,' a state constitution's guarantee of a right to testify,4
1. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 609 (Advisory Comm. Notes).
2. United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973) (Widener, J., dissenting). The
court held that "proof of the incidents involving other children was admissible to prove the
corpus delicti of murder and other acts of child abuse." Id. at 136. However, when a
prosecutor uses a prior conviction of a defendant, not solely for impeachment, but for sub-
stantive purposes, some courts may require exclusion. See, e.g., People v. Russell, 266 N.Y.
147, 194 N.E. 65 (1934); People v. Moore, 20 App. Div. 2d 817, 248 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1964).
3. United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1972).
4. State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as
Santiago].
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the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel,5 the fifth
amendment double jeopardy clause,' and the prohibition against ex post
facto laws.7 In short, a body of constitutional doctrine concerning the use
of prior offenses evidence is in the making. That network of constitutional
decisions will very likely form the basis for increasing consideration of
the constitutional limits of the use of prior offenses evidence.
II. DuE PROCESS AND FAIR TRIAL
The most obvious constitutional provision touched by allowing a
jury to hear evidence that the defendant committed a prior crime is the
right to a fair trial guaranteed by the fifth amendment due process clause.
Prejudicial matters that are not clearly relevant to some genuine issue in
the trial are not admissible under rules of evidence and are barred by the
due process clause if their impact is sufficient to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial on the charge for which he stands indicted. 8
Evidence of an unrelated crime can turn the most fair-minded juror
completely and irretrievably against the defendant. Many eminent jurists
acknowledge that evidence of prior crimes is so prejudicial that cautionary
limiting instructions should immediately be given,9 yet they also realize
the ineffectiveness of such instructions.10 The possibility of such general
prejudice is the most likely result of prior crimes evidence, yet, it is the
most difficult to detect, articulate or demonstrate on appeal. As a result,
appellate claims that evidence of one or more prior crimes generally
prejudiced the jury against the defendant to an intolerable degree seldom
meet with success." Instead, the more successful appellate attacks on the
use of prior crimes evidence have been those that focus on some specific
issue, feature or constitutional right of the defendant.
III. THE RIGHT TO TESTIFY
Prior convictions have historically been admissible into evidence
under so-called "vehicle rules" for three purposes: First, to impeach a
testifying defendant's credibility;' 2 second, to show a similar offense to
5. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1969).
6. Wimgate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1972).
7. United States v. Henson, 486 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane).
8. Lane v. Warden, 320 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1963).
9. United States v. Henson, 486 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring).
10. As Justice Jackson observed in Krulewitch v. United States: "The naive assumption
that pre-judicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury ... all practicing lawyers
know to be unmitigated fiction." 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (concurring opinion). The
similarity of the prior offense to the one in issue is perhaps the principal feature which will
prevent jurors from conscientiously following curative instructions or instructions limiting
the use of the evidence to some specific issue such as credibility or identity. United States v.
Bailey, 426 F.2d 1236, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see United States v. Hildreth, 387 F.2d 328,
329 (4th Cir. 1967).
11. See United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Baldivid,
465 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Mastrotatoro, 455 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1972).
12. Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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evidence handiwork or a common pattern that is uniquely the defen-
dant's;"8 and third, to disclose a prior conviction as a test of the knowl-
edge and constancy of a character witness. 14 Formerly all three 5 were
evaluated largely by similar evidentiary criteria. But since courts have
begun to evaluate the impact of such evidence on a defendant's consti-
tutional rights, differing rules have resulted to govern the three different
situations.
A. Impeaching the Defendant's Credibility
The first of these three bases for admitting evidence of a prior
crime has led to the formulation of the constitutional concept of an
accused's right to testify in his own behalf. In State v. Santiago,'" the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii recently recognized that the threat of impeach-
ment by evidence of a prior conviction often prevents a defendant from
taking the stand to testify in his own defense. That court ruled that the
13. United States v. Mastrotatoro, 455 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Bobbitt, 450 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir.
1973), the court acknowledged that the other offenses did not seem to fit under the
scheme or continuing plan exception because there was no evidence that defendant
engaged in any scheme or plan, or, if so, the objective or motive. The evidence
may have been admissible under the lack of accident exception, although ordinarily
that exception is invoked only where an accused admits that he did the acts charged
but denies the intent necessary to constitute a crime, or contends that he did the
acts accidentally.
Id. at 134.
The court did conclude that the evidence would be admissible under the "accident" and
"signature" exceptions, but preferred to place its decision on the broader ground that such
evidence should not have to comply with an exception but should be presumed to be ad-
missible unless it is offered purely for the purpose of showing a propensity to wrongdoing.
14. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
15. There are, of course, more than three reasons why evidence of another uncharged
crime may be admissible. For example, a tax evasion charge may reveal evidence of an un-
reported bribe or unreported stolen funds. Such "res gestae" evidence that is intimately
related to the proof of the indicted offense is materially different from the peripheral evidence
discussed in this article.
Another example is the admissibility of evidence of bribe attempts, threats to witnesses
or flight as evidence of consciousness of guilt. United States v. Turner, 485 F.2d 976, 983
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (separate opinion); Austin v. United States, 414 F.2d 1155 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
A number of states have recidivist statutes under which a multiple offender can receive
greater punishment once he is proven to be a recidivist. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 586,
n.11 (1967) (reciting a list of state statutes and decisions adopting the Connecticut method
of holding bifurcated trials for determinations of recidivist status). In some jurisdictions,
use of the common law method of admitting prior offenses during the guilt portion of the
trial has been held to be error and a denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury. United States v. Banmiller, 310 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 828 (1963); Lane v. Warden, 320 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1963). These decisions were sub-
sequently overruled by Spencer, which upheld the constitutionality of the common law pro-
cedure. The preferred procedure has been to stage a bifurcated trial. Guilt or innocence on
the charge in issue is determined first. After a verdict is returned, then a separate recidivist
hearing is held to determine punishment and it is only during this later proceeding that
evidence of a prior crime is received. There is little justification for not holding a bifurcated
hearing under recidivist procedures.
16. 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1972).
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state constitution's due process clause forbids a rule of evidence whose
in terrorem effect is to silence a defendant whose only defense may be
his own testimony. Hawaii thus became the first state to bar completely
the use of evidence of prior offenses for impeachment purposes.
There is a certain novelty presented by the concept of a constitutional
right to testify, especially in view of our preoccupation with the historical
fifth amendment right to refrain. But the rationale used by the Supreme
Court of Hawaii in Santiago is really quite sound.17 Furthermore, the
opportunity for a defendant to testify in his own defense is crucial to
most criminal cases. It is often vital to be able to present the testimony
of that one person who may have first hand knowledge of the defense, and
it may be even more necessary to prevent the trier of fact from leaping
to the legally impermissible but logically irresistible conclusion that the
defendant is afraid to testify for fear of exposure."
But what of the exceptional case of a testifying defendant who has
once pleaded guilty to perjury? When his testimony contradicts a reputa-
ble battery of witnesses, does the fair trial requirement mean that a jury
must be kept in the dark about his prior perjury? Admittedly, in a case
where two stories are in conflict and neither can be independently cor-
roborated the interests of justice may require some independent sign
pointing toward the truth. Evidence that one of the parties is an admitted
perjurer would surely tip the balance. Yet, the perjurer may be right, not
because he is generally more honest, but because he happens to be right.
But upon admission of the perjury evidence the prosecutor will be able
to ride the credibility issue and instructions to a conviction.
B. The Requirement of Crimen Falsi
Few cases present such a delicate balance between the testimony of
the accused and that of one other witness, and very few cases involve
evidence of prior perjury. There is widespread disagreement among dif-
ferent jurisdictions as to whether an offense must relate directly to a
trait of honesty, so-called crimen falsi, in order to be used for impeach-
ment.19 Some who favor permitting a broad spectrum of offenses to be
17. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S.
1, 15 (1938); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 417 (1897).
18. Although the prosecutor may not comment on the defendant's failure to testify,
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), prosecutors have many ways of emphasizing that
the government's evidence is uncontradicted, thereby focusing the jury's attention on the
defendant's avoidance of the witness stand.
19. Most courts list various frauds, forgery, embezzlement and even theft offenses in the
category of offenses related to credibility. Many jurisdictions, by statute, have abandoned
any need for the impeaching offense to relate to fraud or falsification. The crimes which
reflect on the witness' credibility and which may be introduced for impeachment purposes
vary among the states and federal circuits. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.050 (1973) which
admits any criminal offense. The Seventh Circuit admits forgery and counterfeiting, but not
theft, robbery, or breaking and entering. United States v. Moorefield, 411 F.2d 1186, 1188
(7th Cir. 1969). The Third Circuit admits felonies or misdemeanors amounting to crimen
falsi. United States v. Remco, 388 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1968). The D.C. Circuit admits con-
1974]
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used for impeachment reason that although murder, for example, does
not require the commission of a falsehood, many people would sooner
believe a tax evader or a perjurer than a murderer. This view may have
some basis in human experience if not in logic. Others who favor the use
of evidence of any prior offense for impeachment simply cannot tolerate
testimony by a defendant who has a record without disclosure of such
record. This rationale is dangerously close to advocating bad character
evidence, and for that reason, is unpersuasive.
In any event, whenever evidence of a prior offense is usable, but
prejudice outweighs probative value, the trial judge should be permitted,
if not required, to exclude that evidence. The Santiago decision correctly
observed that too often the proffered crime has little to do with credibility
victions which rest on dishonest conduct. United States v. Gordon, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C.
Cir. 1967). See also United States v. Chapman, 455 F.2d 746, 749 (5th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Bedgood, 453 F.2d 988, 990 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Thomas, 452 F.2d
1373, 1374-75 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Sinclair v. Turner, 447 F.2d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 1971).
Under the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, a prior offense may be used for impeachment
"only if the crime involved dishonesty or a false statement." Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 609(a).
Similarity of the prior offense to the charge in issue is a two edged sword. It has been
held to be a factor both favoring and militating against admission of that prior offense. In
United States v. Scarborough, 452 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court held that it was
not error to impeach an alibi witness by a prior forgery conviction, where that witness had
received her final release from probation over ten years previously, in view of the close
relevancy between a prior forgery conviction and a witness' credibility. An old prior narcotics
conviction was held to be used improperly to impeach the credibility of a witness in United
States v. Puco, 453 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1971). The court said that narcotics convictions had
little probative value as to the veracity of the witness. The rule, however, is quite different
where a narcotics addict is used as a police informant. In United States v. Kinnard, 465 F.2d
566 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court held that such narcotics informers had special unreliability
and wide latitude should be permitted in cross-examination because of their peculiar motive
to lie to avoid the agonizing imprisonment they face as an addict. It is also a different
matter when a defendant himself creates some specific issue. Often, by denying a certain type
of wrongdoing or by asserting a prior unblemished record, a defendant can pull an otherwise
inadmissible prior offense in against himself. United States v. Gray, 468 F.2d 257 (3d Cir.
1972) ; United States v. Belperio, 452 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1971).
Once a conviction qualifies as the type usable for impeachment the jurisdictions divide
sharply over whether a court can exercise its discretion and evaluate whether the prejudice
to the defendant substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence and thus ex-
clude it. See United States v. Williams, 445 F.2d 421 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Vigo,
435 F.2d 1347, 1351 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 908 (1971); United States v.
Greenberg, 419 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1969) (per curiam); United States v. Allison, 414 F.2d
407, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970); United States v. Palumbo,
401 F.2d 270, 273 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 947 (1969); United States v.
Hildreth, 387 F.2d 328, 329 (4th Cir. 1967). The remaining jurisdictions admit all prior
convictions. United States v. Scanpellino, 431 F.2d 475, 478-79 (8th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Escobedo, 430 F.2d 14, 18-20 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 951 (1971);
United -States v. Griffin, 378 F.2d 445, 446 (6th Cir. 1967) (per curiam). The District of
Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 does not allow judicial discretion
in determining the admissibility of prior convictions. D.C. CODE § 14-305 (1973). The
Advisory Committee's version of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence was in accord
with the District of Columbia statute. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 609. But see United States v.
Henson, 486 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) as to the constitutionality of retroactive
applicati6n of D.C. CODE § 14-305 (1973). The House Committee version of the rule favors
the Luck doctrine and grants discretion to the trial judge to exclude prejudicial offenses. See
Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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as an isolated issue, and yet it carries so high a risk of poisoning a jury
against the defendant that responsible defense counsel must reluctantly
advise a defendant to sacrifice the right to testify to avoid the impact of
such evidence.
The Santiago rationale of a constitutionally protected right to testify
precludes any evidentiary rule of case law or statute which admits prior
crimes evidence against a testifying defendant solely for the purpose of
impeaching his credibility as a witness. However, there are other situa-
tions in which prior crimes evidence is presently admissible, and which
might remain unaffected by an exclusionary rule fashioned to protect the
right to testify.
C. The Similar Crimes Rule
There are great differences between the use of prior crimes evidence
to impeach the credibility of a testifying defendant and the use of such
evidence under the "similar crimes" exception to the general rule that
character evidence is not admissible simply to prove guilt or to show a
disposition to crime. That exception provides that evidence of other
crimes, wrongs or acts is admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or ac-
cident.20
The "credibility impeachment" rationale for telling a jury the defen-
dant committed another crime differs in four respects from the "similar
crimes" rule: (1) impeachment crimes are used only against a testifying
defendant; 2 (2) their admissibility and usage relate to the general sub-
20. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 404(b):
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. This subdivision
does not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
The extensive list of vague categories under which prior crimes evidence may be admitted
has been summarized in United States v. Bobbitt, 450 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The
following array of rationales for use of prior crimes evidence is available to an imaginative
prosecutor: to complete the story of the crime by proving its immediate context of happen-
ings close in time and place (as in "res gestae") ; to prove the existence of a larger continuing
plan, scheme or conspiracy of which the present crime is part; "signature" crime so nearly
identical in method as to earmark them as the handiwork of the accused; propensity for
illicit sexual relations with the particular person concerned in the trial to indicate that the
similar acts were not unintentional or accidental; to establish motive which in turn can
serve to establish identity, deliberateness, malice or specific intent; to show by immediate
inference malice, deliberation, ill will or the specific intent required for a particular crime;
or to prove identity. In Bobbitt the court held that the evidence (an incident of wielding a
shotgun) was proper and that defendant was not entitled to a limiting instruction since the
evidence related to a state of mind (motive) which is so closely related to proof of the
commission of the act that the crime is probative of identity as well as state of mind.
Although the failure to limit the jury's use of other crimes was said to be error in some
cases and "may even be plain error," the court held it was not error in this case.
21. State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1972). Of course, any witness may
be impeached by evidence of a prior conviction of a crime involving dishonesty. In fact, in
a civil case in the tax court where the taxpayer did not even testify, the court still allowed
1974]
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ject of credibility, not to a specific fact issue or element of the offense;"2
(3) the type of crime required need not be similar to the offense charged,
but it must be based on a conviction and must be related, in most courts,
to a trait of honesty;2" and (4) an instruction on the limited use of the
evidence is uniformly required.24
The "similar crimes" rule, by comparison, is used even against a non-
testifying defendant as part of the government's case in chief.25 The prior
offense must be similar in some fashion to the crime charged but need not
be based on a conviction. 2 The right to an instruction on limited use of
"impeachment" of his sworn tax return, which was in evidence, by showing a prior con-
viction. Masters v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1957). The credibility-impeachment
rule is similar but not identical to the rule relating to the cross-examination of a character
witness under which the character witness may be asked about matters, including convictions
of the defendant, relating to the specific character trait in issue. That trait may or may not be
credibility. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
22. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948). Evidence of the defendant's general
character is not admissible when he testifies, however, prior convictions evidencing lack of
credibility are admissible. United States v. Augello, 452 F.2d 1135, 1139-40 (2d Cir. 1971);
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 608(a).
23. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948). Impeachment of the credibility of
a witness can be done by reputation testimony or by use of a criminal act that resulted in
a conviction, but not by use of a prior criminal act that did not result in conviction. Derrick
v. Wallace, 217 N.Y. 620, 112 N.E. 440 (1916). In this regard, a mere witness is less im-
peachable than a defendant who may have a prior crime admitted in the government's case
in chief. Also, the extrinsic proof cannot be offered for credibility impeachment unless the
witness has been asked about the conviction on cross-examination. People v. Cardillo, 207
N.Y. 70, 100 N.E. 715 (1912).
24. See Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See generally Gordon v.
United States, 383 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Evidence of offenses committed sub-
sequent to the crime charged in the indictment is generally inadmissible. Bracey v. United
States, 142 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 762 (1944). In McHale v. United
States, 398 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1968), a mail fraud prosecution, the court ruled that evidence
of fraud which occurred after the indictment could be admitted only after the application of
a "balancing process." The factors to be balanced are (1) the relevance of the subsequent
crime to the issue of intent; (2) the quantity of the evidence adduced to establish the counts
charged in the indictment; and (3) the relative volume of testimony presented on subsequent
misconduct. Here, the court found prejudicial error in the admission of such extensive
testimony of events subsequent to the indictment.
25. Mastrotatoro v. United States, 455 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Smith, 446 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1971); C. McCoRMIcx, LAw oF EVIENCE, § 157, at 328 (1st
ed. 1954). Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
26. United States v. Bussey, 432 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The court reversed a
conviction where evidence of other robberies had been admitted in a robbery prosecution
since they were not so similar as to show a particular pattern. The court criticized the fact
that the instruction was given only at the conclusion of the case and disapproved the text of
the instruction since it advised the jury that "evidence has been introduced that the defendant
committed an offense similar in nature" to the one for which he is now on trial. Id. at 1334
n.17. Whether or not the alleged prior offense is "similar" is, of course, for the jury to deter-
mine. United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973). Where the defendant in an
infanticide trial has never been prosecuted for other alleged child murders, the court acknowl-
edged that
[tihe evidence of what happened to the other children is not, strictly speaking,
evidence of other crimes. There was no evidence that defendant was an accused
with respect to the deaths or respiratory difficulties of the other children except for
Judy....
Id. at 133.
Dissenting Judge Widener stated that although a record conviction was not necessary,
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the evidence, though generally required, is not uniformly recognized for
the entire list of exceptions.
The significance of these differences is considerable both procedurally
and in the constitutional considerations that arise under each of the rules.
For example, the precise ratio decidendi of the Santiago decision does not
extend to the use of "similar crimes" evidence since similar offenses are
admissible whether or not the defendant testifies. But even evidence of
similar offenses introduced during the government's case can under some
circumstances keep the defendant off the stand.
It is entirely conceivable that a defendant may be quite willing to
testify in his defense on the charge in issue, but have good reasons for
not testifying about the prior offense. Where, for example, a defendant
facing a multi-count indictment is willing to testify about one count but
not another, he may be entitled to a severance of the counts.2" Likewise,
there may be a case where the introduction of a "similar" crime into
evidence would prevent the defendant from testifying. For example, the
similar crime, if admitted, might subject him to further prosecution or
present such a risk of it that in the midst of his testimony he would have
to invoke the fifth amendment as to the similar offense.29
the proof of the prior act must be of a "sufficient quality to permit its admissibility." He
stated that "evidence of prior merely suspicious occurrences is no substitute for clear and
conclusive proof." Id. at 140-41.
Often the prior offense used as evidence is not represented by a conviction. Prior
similar criminal acts are deemed to be admissible under the same evidentiary standards of
relevance as prior convictions for similar offenses though they obviously lack the quality of
a prior record conviction. However, there is also additional prejudice involved when a record
conviction is used since the conviction reflects to the jury that the state or federal govern-
ment was sufficiently affected by the conduct that it prosecuted, and a court or jury was
sufficiently convinced by their case that the defendant was convicted. In United States v.
Bobbitt, 450 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court adhered to the general rule that evidence of
a prior criminal act is not admissible to show a predisposition to crime, but is admissible to
show a motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, or common scheme or plan. It upheld
admission of a shotgun threatening incident twelve years earlier between the defendant and
a murder victim as relevant to their prior relationship, which in turn was relevant to motive.
27. In United States v. Bobbitt, 450 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court indicated that
where the past pattern of criminal acts introduced into evidence is offered not only for
intent but also on the issue of identity, an instruction limiting the use of the evidence need
not be given. In fact, the court indicated that there is a category of cases where the evidence
of a prior criminal act is related to a state of mind, such as motive, which itself is so closely
related to proof of commission of the act on trial that the prior crime is probative of identity
as well as state of mind. In such cases, it held, the jury is not to be prevented from drawing
the further inference that it was defendant who committed the crime, and therefore no
limiting instruction need be given. But see id. at 694 (Fahy, S.J. dissenting). While the
lack of an instruction must be considered harmful, the giving of a limiting instruction cer-
tainly is little assurance that a lay jury will appreciate it.
28. Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Cross v. United States, 335
F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
29. While such a claim by a defendant on the witness stand would be highly prejudicial,
he would be entitled to assert it and not have waived it by testifying on some matters. See
Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Under the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, rule 513(b), so far as possible, all claims of privilege are to be made outside of
the presence of the jury.
Where defendant testifies, if he is asked about a prior criminal act for which he has
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D. The Supervisory Power of Appellate Courts
The chief restrictions on the use of "similar crimes" evidence fall
short of actual constitutional stature for they have occurred in the higher-
than-evidentiary field that is sometimes called the supervisory power of
appellate courts. The Supreme Court of Louisiana recently reversed a
robbery conviction because of the use of other crimes evidence. Louisi-
ana's statutes permitted introduction of evidence of other uncharged
offenses if relevant to show intent, knowledge or system. However, the
case involved the robbery of a bus driver and there was no question that
whoever did it knew what he was doing and intended to do it. Therefore,
inadvertence or lack of intent was not seriously in issue, yet that was the
purported justification for admission of evidence that the defendant had
earlier robbed a service station. 0
The court not only reversed the conviction, but under its supervisory
power, it promulgated a rule requiring the state to comply with five
requirements before it can introduce evidence of other crimes:
1. Defendant must be given a statement of the acts to be
offered within a reasonable time before trial and they must be
described with the particularity required of an indictment. The
court said no such notice is required as to evidence of offenses
which are simply part of the res gestae, or for impeachment
convictions.
2. The government must specify the exception to the ex-
clusionary rule upon which it relies.
3. It must show that the evidence is not repetitive or cumu-
lative and is not a subterfuge for depicting the defendant's bad
character or his propensity for bad behavior and that it serves
the actual purpose for which it was offered.
4. Defendant is entitled to an immediate limiting instruc-
tion upon introduction of the evidence.
5. The final charge to the jury must also contain a limiting
instruction, and the court must advise the jury that the defen-
dant cannot be convicted for any charge other than the one
named in the indictment. 81
Other courts have used their supervisory power to fashion rules that
limit the circumstances under which evidence of similar crimes can be
introduced, but few have imposed restrictions as effective as the Loui-
siana court.
just as there is an apparently compelling need to introduce a prior
perjury conviction against a testifying defendant who squarely contra-
not been tried or granted immunity, and which is not barred by the statute of limitations, he
would be entitled to invoke the fifth amendment and will not have waived the privilege by
testifying, even about his own character. See People v. Johnson, 228 N.Y. 332, 127 N.E.
186 (1920).
30. State v. Prieur, - La. -, 277 So. 2d 126 (1973).
31. Id. at __, 277 So. 2d at 130.
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dicts the only witness against him, the similar crimes rule also presents
a few examples where the "need" for the similar crimes evidence is par-
ticularly strong and therefore highly tempting. In prosecutions for espe-
cially heinous crimes, it is often unusually difficult to find evidence. In
cases of child abuse and infanticide, for example, the victim is incapable
of testimony; there are no eye witnesses; no evidence of a struggle; and
no logical motive-only highly suspicious circumstances. Under these
circumstances it is not difficult to appreciate the temptation a trial judge
must face if there is competent evidence that the defendant has, not once
but several times, committed physical abuse against infants or actually
killed them. Should he exclude them and risk an acquittal? Realizing that
infanticide by oxygen deprivation (smothering) is one of the most diffi-
cult to prove crimes yet one of the most horrendous, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in a recent case in which the defendant was charged
with the murder of her eight month old adopted son and attempted mur-
der and mistreatment of her two year old daughter, acknowledged that
there was a "critical need" for evidence of prior offenses. In that case,
nine children had suffered cyanosis or oxygen deprivation after having
been left alone with defendant, and seven of them had died over a period
of many years. The Fourth Circuit was tempted by such important evi-
dence of prior criminal acts and it succumbed to the temptation. The
prior acts, though similar, fit no clear exception to the exclusionary rule.
Therefore, the court of appeals completely discarded the exclusionary rule.
It held that "the evidence is so persuasive and so necessary in case of
infanticide or other child abuse by suffocation if the wrongdoer is to be
apprehended, that we think that its relevance clearly outweighs its prej-
udicial effect on the jury.Y5 2
E. Rebuttal of Character Testimony
The third purpose for which evidence of prior crimes may be used
is "character witness rebuttal." When the defendant calls a character
witness to testify to his favorable reputation for the trait of character
relevant to the criminal charge, he puts that reputation in issue and the
character witness may then be asked whether he is sufficiently well in-
formed concerning the defendant's reputation that the jury ought to
believe his testimony. Pursuant to such an inquiry he may be asked
whether he is aware of prior convictions, prior criminal acts or the general
reputation of the defendant for certain adverse conduct in the community,
so long as that conduct is relevant to the trait to which the character wit-
32. United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 135 (4th Cir. 1973). Dissenting Judge Widener
severely chastised the majority for overemphasizing the "need for the evidence" as a factor to
be considered. He stated that "[the infirmity in this formulation is that as the need for the
evidence increases, the probative value may decrease and still the evidence will be admissible."
In addition, this rationale may produce a rule of evidence that "the end may justify the
means." Id. at 141 n.S.
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ness testifies.Y3 This rule, even when applied with discretion and restraint,
can serve to prejudice a defendant by effectively depriving him of the
opportunity to produce evidence of his good reputation. What is lacking
in this situation is any constitutionally protected right to produce evi-
dence of good character.34
F. Evidence Rules Lack Consistency
There is a great anomaly revealed by a comparison of the type of
evidence admissible against a defendant with evidence which is not ad-
missible against a mere witness. A witness generally cannot be impeached
by prior criminal acts unless he has been successfully prosecuted for them.
However, a defendant who does not even testify can have introduced
against him evidence of prior acts for which he was not prosecuted. And
while the good character of a defendant cannot be proven in most juris-
dictions by evidence of specific instances of good conduct, the govern-
ment is permitted to prove his bad character, criminal intent or common
scheme by evidence of specific instances of uncharged and unproven
criminal misconduct.
G. The Common Bond of Prejudice
The above three vehicle rules share in common the sensational and
prejudicial impact of a disclosure that the man on trial has been there
before for something else (or that he should have been) . 5 Each injects
the issue of recidivism into the trial. Additionally, due to the vagueness
of the standards defining the admissibility of each type of evidence, only
33. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948). See also United States v. Roland,
449 F.2d 1281, 1282 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Davenport, 449 F.2d 696 (Sth Cir.
1971); Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1). However, it is generally held that a defendant's
character may be proven only by a statement of a witness concerning the defendant's reputa-
tion in the community and not by a witness's statement of an opinion as to the defendant's
character or by recitation of a specific instance of conduct. United States v. Bishton, 463
F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Davenport, 449 F.2d 696, 699 (5th Cir. 1971).
The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, rules 405(a) & (b), would permit both opinion
testimony and evidence of specific instances of conduct as proof of a trait of character when
the trait is a specific element of the charge.
34. See United States v. Fox, 473 F.2d 131 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The D.C. Circuit reversed a
conviction where the trial judge ruled that if defendant produced a character witness, that
witness could be asked about a prior conviction of defendant's. The court held that the trialjudge's ruling was erroneous and that its effect was to keep the character witness off the
stand, thus improperly depriving the defendant of a substantial right to produce evidence
of good character. Though not of constitutional proportions, the right is important enough
to produce a reversal.
35. While no case has been found dealing with the attempted use of evidence of a
criminal act as an alleged similar offense for which a defendant has been granted immunity,
courts clearly preclude the "use" of such evidence against defendants. Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). See also United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973).
In United States v. Hockenberry, 474 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1973), the court reversed a conviction
where the government introduced immunized grand jury testimony to show the falsity
of defendant's statements. This supports the conclusion that all uses of immunized testimony
are barred by 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (Supp. 1973).
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a modicum of probative worth on the vehicle issue is required in actual
practice. As a result, their marginal worth as legitimate evidence is fre-
quently overwhelmed by their prejudicial impact.
Despite this common bond of prejudice, the courts have more heavily
criticized the similar crimes rule, 6 while the "credibility-impeachment"
rationale, which directly chills a defendant's wish to testify, has received
more attention in legislative efforts. Thus, as courts now turn to the
constitutional issues raised by these three rules, the situational differences
they entail demonstrate that no single principle necessarily governs all
three uses of this evidence, and that the precise details and history of the
evidence itself are germane to the constitutional issues of the right to
counsel, ex post facto laws and, most importantly, double jeopardy.
IV. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In Loper v. Beto,8" the Supreme Court recently ordered issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus where a conviction was obtained by the use of
evidence of prior crimes to impeach the testifying defendant. Evidence
of prior offenses could not be used against the defendant where the
convictions were constitutionally invalid due to a denial of the right to
counsel. The Court based its decision on the concept of fundamental
fairness and stated: "the conclusion is inescapable that the use of con-
victions constitutionally invalid under Gideon v. Wainwright to impeach
a defendant's credibility deprives him of due process of law. ' 88
The Loper rationale opens the validity of the prior conviction, if
there is one, to inquiry. It suggests, in fact, that other fundamental de-
fects in a prior conviction should serve as a basis for exclusion on grounds
of "fundamental fairness." For if the denial of the right to counsel in the
prior trial taints both the prior conviction and the present one, it is clear
that the Supreme Court shares the view that prior crimes evidence plays
a major role in the trial of a case, ranking only slightly below an outright
confession.
Yet under some circumstances prior crimes evidence is received
36. Contra, United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1972) (en banc). The
Tenth Circuit, in reversing a Dyer Act conviction obtained by the introduction of two other
Dyer Act convictions, acknowledged the tendency of courts to equate the similar crimes
rule with the rule allowing impeachment of a defendant after he testifies, but concluded the
operation of the rules is vastly different. Although that case was decided on evidentiary
grounds, the court's language contains clear constitutional overtones. The court said that
the similar crimes rule should not be applied by rote since it involved not merely a rule of
evidence but an issue of "fundamental fairness and justice of the trial itself." Id. at 205.
37. 405 U.S. 473 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Loper]. Although the convictions
erroneously admitted in this case occurred before the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), they were rendered invalid by its retroactive application.
38. 405 U.S. at 483; accord, Howard v. Craven, 446 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1971). Burgett
v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967) held that convictions without the assistance of counsel cannot
be used against the defendant to support a finding of guilt. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S.
443 (1972) held that prior convictions without counsel could not be used to enhance punish-
ment.
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where there has been no conviction at all, not even a defective one. Some
cases, in fact, permit such evidence where there has actually been an
acquittal. Wholly aside from the double jeopardy and collateral estoppel
problems raised by this latter situation, if "fundamental fairness" and due
process require exclusion of constitutionally defective convictions from
evidence, those same concepts should certainly require exclusion of an
alleged offense of which defendant was acquitted or for which prosecution
was declined.
V. FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND PENDING APPEALS
In permitting inquiry into the validity of the prior conviction, the
Court has opened up the broader question of what position a trial judge
should take when the proffered conviction is on appeal. The proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence would permit the use of those prior offenses
which are on appeal for purposes of impeachment, regardless of and with-
out any inquiry into the grounds for appeal.Y9 The United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit, in United States v. Penta,40 appears to
have adopted the same approach. The court specifically said that it did
not mean to suggest that it would condone introduction of state convic-
tions that had already been overturned on the basis of an illegal search
prior to the time of the federal trial. The court even suggested that there
is authority against that procedure. However, carefully restricting its
opinion to the question of what to do when convictions on which an
appeal is pending on constitutional grounds are offered by the prosecution,
it concluded that they should be admitted and the federal conviction
would not be reversed later if the state convictions are subsequently re-
versed on grounds unrelated to the integrity of the fact finding process,
i.e., on the basis of unlawfully obtained evidence.41 While an accused will
39. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 609(e).
40. 475 F.2d 92 (1st Cir. 1973). The majority rule is that a conviction on which an
appeal is pending is nevertheless admissible despite the pendency of the appeal. United States
v. Allen, 457 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1972) ; see United States v. Griffin, 434 F.2d 978 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 955 (1971). Contra, Beto v. Stacks, 408 F.2d 313 (5th Cir.
1969); Campbell v. United States, 176 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
41. United States v. Penta, 475 F.2d 92 (1st Cir. 1973). Defendant was tried for possession
of counterfeit bills and his defense was entrapment. To impeach that defense the prosecution
introduced prior state convictions. Those state convictions were subsequently overturned by
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts because some of the evidence resulted from an illegal
search. Defendant contended that the use of invalid convictions to impeach his testimony
required reversal of his federal conviction. The First Circuit upheld his federal conviction
on the grounds that his case was distinguishable from Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972),
but was in accord with Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) and Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Under the same circumstances, the Fifth Circuit held that it
was error to admit such pending convictions which were ultimately reversed for the reason
that the evidence was unlawfully obtained. Beto v. Stacks, 408 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1969).
However, the First Circuit concluded that the policy of the fourth amendment's exclusionary
rule had already been carried out by the reversal of the prior convictions, and that since
the use of the illegally obtained evidence did not in any way vitiate the culpability or the
fact finding process, there was no need to carry the punitive effect of the fourth amendment
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generally be permitted to show that an appeal is pending on the impeach-
ing conviction, that is far from an impressive reply to the use of the
conviction.42
VI. EQUAL PROTECTION
A felon has a greatly increased risk of conviction in any subsequent
prosecution merely because he has a record. He may be presented to the
jury as a man with a record during the government's case in chief if the
prior offense is similar to the offense in issue. If, instead, it is an offense
admissible for impeachment, he may not enjoy the right or the ability to
testify in his own defense. Even if the prior offense is dissimilar to the
indicted offense and does not relate to credibility, it may be employed
to test the validity of any character testimony and, therefore, may prevent
him from presenting character testimony for fear of poisoning the jury
by disclosure of the prior conviction. Any of these drawbacks might itself
be sufficient to deny due process; but they clearly make the status of
convicted felons unequal to that of other defendants.
Indeed, in questionable investigations convicted felons stand a far
greater chance of being indicted than do suspects without a record who
might be faced with similar evidence. The presence of an admissible
prior conviction is a significant factor in leading prosecutors to decide
whom to indict in the first place. With a weak or marginal charge, the
prior offense will give them the confidence to take a chance at convicting
the previously convicted suspect.
No decision has been found which attaches constitutional significance
to this inequality since it is not based on race, creed or national origin;
however, the equal protection clause is no longer restricted to such de-
nials. Cases have held that the clause is violated if unequal treatment is
based upon a factor that does not qualify as rational. Although no case
has been found holding that a prior conviction is either a rational or
irrational factor within the meaning of equal protection decisions, writers
have suggested that it is not a sufficiently rational factor to withstand
the test of the fourteenth amendment.4 It has at least been suggested
that if use of prior convictions is not a denial of equal protection per se,
statutes which permit cross-examination of the defendant concerning all
prior convictions, constitute an invidious discrimination due to the lack
of a reasonable connection between credibility and a prior crime and that
such statutes are therefore a denial of equal protection. Furthermore, the
any further by having it reverse a subsequent federal conviction in which evidence of the
defective prior conviction was used. United States v. Penta, 475 F.2d 92 (1st Cir. 1973).
42. An accused impeached by a conviction may try to explain, and, in some jurisdictions,
protest his innocence. United States v. Boyer, 150 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1945). But in some
he may not protest his innocence. Sims v. Sims, 75 N.Y. 466 (1878). A pardon, annulment or
certificate of rehabilitation, however, may destroy admissibility. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid.
609.
43. Note, 37 U. Cim. L. REv. 168, 179 (1928).
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argument made in Furman v. Georgia44 that implementation of the death
penalty falls disproportionately and, therefore, improperly on southern,
black, rape defendants may provide the kernel of an equal protection
argument in the area of prior offenses evidence also.
VII. Ex POST FACTO LAWS
The constitutional issue most recently presented by the use of prior
offenses is the violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia formulated
what has become nationally known as the Luck doctrine. Under this
rule, the trial judge is given broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence
of prior convictions, when used to impeach, if their prejudicial impact
outweighs their probative value.
Evaluations of the Luck rule have uniformly acknowledged that it
has greatly decreased the use of prior offenses evidence. Then, in 1971,
Congress enacted the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal
Procedure Act.4 That Act contained a provision which makes mandatory
the admission of prior offenses that meet the statute's tests. Under the
Act, if the conviction occurred within the last ten years and relates to
credibility, it must be admitted.47 However, in United States v. Henson,"
the constitutionality of the Act was challenged on several grounds and
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc,
recently ruled that the effect on the accused of this procedural change is
so significant and so alters the situation to his disadvantage, that retro-
active application of the new rule is unconstitutional as an ex post facto
law. In addition, the court spoke of the deterrent effect of prior crimes
on the defendant's willingness to testify. It said that "[t]o the extent
this deterrence is determinative in a situation where an accused's testi-
mony is his only defense, its effect is self-evident even if it may not be
unconstitutional. '49
The court declined to reach the broader question of the overall con-
stitutionality of the Act since retroactive application was an adequate
basis for decision. It noted, however, that the statute before it was highly
similar to rule 609 of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence now be-
fore Congress, which if enacted in that form, would present the identical
problem. 50
44. 408 U.S. 238 (1973).
45. The name derives from Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See
H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), amending the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
by the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary Committee.
46. 14 D.C. CoDE § 305 (1971).
47. Id.
48. 486 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) [hereinafter referred to as Henson].
49. 486 F.2d at 1308.
50. Id. Rule 609 has both embraced and rejected the Luck rule from time to time during
its gestation. The March 1971 draft of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
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VIII. THE RIGHT TO REQUIRE PROOF BEYOND
A REASONABLE DOUBT
The Henson case mentioned, as one reason for its result, the great
effect evidence of a prior offense has on easing the government's burden
of proof. Defendants have a constitutional right to require proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt." Henson raised but did not answer the
question whether a conviction aid such as prior crimes evidence might
not actually destroy that right.52
The reasonable doubt requirement is intimately connected with
prior crimes evidence in several ways. The historical reluctance to permit
use of juvenile delinquency adjudications for impeachment has been
grounded in large part on the lesser burden of proof required for such
adjudications.58 Yet in order to admit evidence of prior crimes which did
not result in conviction, it is only required that the prosecution prove by
clear and convincing evidence that defendant committed that offense.
Such a lowered standard is wholly inappropriate for evidence of this
type.5
A converse analogy exists under present law where an acquittal in
a criminal tax evasion case does not bar the government from asserting
the existence of fraud in a civil tax case against the same taxpayer for
the same years because, though it failed to prove criminal tax evasion
beyond a "reasonable doubt," it may still be able to sustain the lesser
burden of proving civil fraud by only "clear and convincing evidence. ' 55
If the use of a prior crime as evidence does nothing more than
permit a conviction, where the evidence on the charge itself when fairly
viewed, does not rise to the level of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, this alone should be a basis for exclusion on constitutional grounds.
At the very least, introduction of such evidence should require a thresh-
old determination that the evidence could satisfy the reasonable doubt
standard.
Evidence provided that no conviction is admissible if "the judge determines that the probative
value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice." This provision which essentially embodies the Luck rule was abandoned in
October, 1971. However, in H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) the rule was changed
back to the discretionary Luck rule.
51. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
52. 486 F.2d at 1292.
53. See Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1966); Thomas v. United
States, 121 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
54. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972); United States v. Bussey, 432 F.2d 1330
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Smith v. United States, 361 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wrather v. State,
179 Tenn. 666, 169 S.W.2d 854 (1943). Judge Widener, dissenting in United States v. Woods,
said that the defendant was denied a fair trial because "the evidence of prior occurrences,
fitting no recognized exception to the general rule, was so highly inflammatory and prej-
udicial, as well as being neither plain, nor clear, nor convincing, that it should not have
been admitted for any purpose, much less for all purposes." 484 F.2d 127, 139 (4th Cir. 1973).
55. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
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IX. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
By far the most complex and interesting constitutional objection,
and the one that goes to the essence of use of prior convictions evidence,
is the plea of double jeopardy. While there would still remain the possi-
bility of introducing other criminal acts that have not been prosecuted,
the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment,"6 if read broadly,
would dispose of the great bulk of prior crimes evidence. If a defendant
has once been put in jeopardy for an offense, that prior offense should
not be used against him again in a criminal prosecution.
However it has not been liberally construed. The double jeopardy
clause may rank as the most narrowly and restrictively interpreted clause
of the Bill of Rights. The remainder of this article analyzes at length the
history of Supreme Court litigation which has permitted double prosecu-
tions and, therefore, evidentiary use of offenses for which the defendant
once stood trial, and the significance of recent decisions and writings
which in several major respects suggest that prior offenses may run afoul
of the double jeopardy clause.
A. The Narrowness of the Double Jeopardy Clause
This constitutional prohibition that ostensibly denies the government
the luxury of requiring a defendant to stand trial twice for the same
offense57 is currently so riddled with exceptions that it is sometimes
difficult to determine whether the historical distaste for harassing, rep-
etitious prosecutions which fathered the double jeopardy clause is re-
flected any longer in the American law of double jeopardy.58 Decisions
of every court in the nation require criminal defendants in one form or
another to endure a second time the agony, risk, expense and notoriety
that collectively mean jeopardy. Only a few federal and state courts
seem to wince at the sizeable list of exceptions to the double jeopardy
clause."9
56. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that no
person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
57. Id.
58. There are some countries that allow the dangerous practice of trying people
twice. I am inserting below a recent news item about a man who was tried, con-
victed, sentenced to prison, and then was tried again, convicted and sentenced to
death. Similar examples are not hard to find in lands torn by revolution or crushed
by dictatorship. I had thought that our constitutional protections embodied in the
Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses would have barred any. such things
happening here. Unfortunately, last year's holdings by this Court . . . , and today's
affirmance of the convictions of Bartkus and Abbate cause me to fear that in an
important number of cases it can happen here.
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 163-64 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
59. The clause not only prevents double punishment, but also prohibits double jeopardy
as well. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966). Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in
Ashe v. Swenson, called the many possibilities for double prosecutions "frightening." He
said: "In my view, the Double Jeopardy Clause requires the prosecution, except in most
limited circumstances, to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out
of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction." He listed a variety of circum-
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The variety of local, state and federal criminal statutes and ordi-
nances that can be broken by a single episode of criminal conduct make
an impressive list. Successive prosecutions are frequently begun by the
local,60 state61 and federal6 2 governments for the same act. Yet after the
first prosecution, the second tribunal finds it must apply highly technical
tests to the vagaries of the particular offense, and that it must thoroughly
study the precise history of the prior prosecution before it can begin to
tell whether double jeopardy is a bar. Such an exercise seems quite a de-
parture from the absolute bar apparently intended by the brief and simple
double jeopardy clause; but the numerous issues developed by the case
law make such a complex analysis necessary in almost every case.
The following host of issues represents only a few of the double
jeopardy questions commonly litigated: Does double jeopardy in fact at-
tach upon the impanelling of a jury?"' Must there be a "manifest neces-
sity" for declaration of a mistrial so that a retrial is permissible?6 4 Did
the defendant cause or consent to the declaration of a mistrial?65 Can the
stances under which an overly technical interpretation of the evidence required for two
prosecutions "virtually annuls the constitutional guarantee." 397 U.S. 436, 451 (1970). Under
the narrow "same evidence" test he noted that crimes against several victims could be
prosecuted separately; crimes where a single transaction is divisible into chronologically
discrete crimes could be prosecuted separately; and a single criminal act may lead to
multiple prosecutions if it is viewed from the perspective of different statutes.
60. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
61. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
62. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
63. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973). The defendant had been indicted by a
grand jury and brought to trial. The jury was sworn, but before any evidence was taken,
the state moved to dismiss the indictment because it failed to allege criminal intent. Defendant
was subsequently reindicted, tried and convicted. The Seventh Circuit concluded, in light of
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971), that jeopardy had attached and, in the absence
of any affirmative action on the part of the defendant requesting or requiring a mistrial,
a retrial was barred on grounds of double jeopardy. The argument is largely related to the
question whether the defect in the indictment was jurisdictional. See Illinois v. Somerville,
410 U.S. 458, 459 (1973).
64. United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1972). The court held that the
declaration of a mistrial precluded a retrial where the jury, though reporting it had been
deadlocked, advised the court it was near a verdict if it could deliberate ten more minutes.
Defendant objected to the court's declaring a mistrial. The court of appeals found no
"manifest necessity" for declaration of a mistrial and held that a retrial was barred.
65. A defendant's request for a mistrial generally waives the claim of double jeopardy.
Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373 (1955). Thus, if a defendant moves for a mistrial or his
interest was the exclusive motivation for declaring it, a retrial is permissible. United States
v. Pappas, 445 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir. 1971). Retrial after a hung jury is, of course, proper.
United States v. Phillips, 431 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1970). And in United States v. Walden,
448 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1971), reconsidered en bane, 458 F.2d 36 (1972), a panel of the Fourth
Circuit reversed a conviction after a second trial for several defendants whose first trial ended
in a mistrial because two jurors had seen defendants in handcuffs. The trial judge had invited
requests for mistrial. Some defendants filed motions, but others did not. The conviction was
reversed by the panel on double jeopardy grounds as to all defendants, even those who
requested a mistrial, reasoning that the request was virtually thrust upon them by circum-
stance. 448 F.2d at 929-31. On reconsideration en banc, an equally divided court affirmed the
district court's ruling on double jeopardy and remanded to the panel for disposition of the
remaining issues. 458 F.2d at 37.
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state appeal a dismissal6" or acquittal 7 and retry the defendant? Do con-
secutive sentences for different counts of an indictment constitute a form
of double punishment for essentially the same offense?"8 After a success-
ful defense appeal, is a retrial 9 or a harsher sentence permissible? 70 Are
successive prosecutions permitted if not based on exactly the same evi-
dence,71 or is any prosecution based on the same transaction 72 prohibited?
66. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972). A dismissal of the indictment
before jeopardy attaches does not prevent an appeal and trial by the government.
67. In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), the Court held that federal double
jeopardy standards were not applicable against the states. Thus, the state of Connecticut was
permitted, under a state statute, to appeal the acquittal Palko had won at trial and to
retry him. Palko was subsequently overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794
(1969).
68. In United States v. Hughes, 195 F. Supp. 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), 18 counts of an
indictment charged the defendant with violating the Securities Act Mail Fraud Statute, 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1973). The separate counts differed only as to the person to whom material
was sent by mail. The Court ruled that the separate counts must be consolidated since they
charge but a "single fraudulent course of conduct alleged and realleged 18 times in the
indictment." Id. at 798. Such a consolidation prevents 18 separate punishments for what is
but a single crime. However, the issue of multiplicity of indictments is a highly technical
one and the same court refused to order consolidation of several counts charging violation of
the Mail Fraud Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1973) on the theory that the gravamen of the
mail fraud offense is not the fraudulent scheme but each use of the mails and thus each
mailing can be separately charged and separately punished. See United States v. Brandom,
320 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Mo. 1970). See also United States v. Universal C.I.T. Cred. Corp.,
334 U.S. 218 (1952). Must the prosecution join at one trial all charges against a defendant?
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, recently dissenting from the denial
of a petition for writ of certiorari stated:
In my view the Double Jeopardy Clause applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), requires the prosecu-
tion, except in most limited circumstances not present here, to join at one trial all
the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence,
episode, or transaction.
Miller v. Oregon, 405 U.S. 1047 (1972).
69. After a successful appeal by a defendant, the double jeopardy clause is no bar to
a retrial. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
70. The double jeopardy clause is not an absolute bar to increased punishment. North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). Pearce forbids unexplained increases in a sentence
after a retrial, but it is clear that it does not forbid an increase in punishment when, for
example, the accused's conduct between trials warrants additional punishment. Rivera v.
Rose, 465 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1972). A harsher sentence under a "two tier" misdemeanor trial
system which permits a de novo retrial in a court of record after the first trial does not
violate the double jeopardy clause. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); McClung v.
Weatherholtz, 351 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Va. 1972).
71. It is claimed that the United States Supreme Court has given some credence to
the "same evidence" test by applying it to certain situations. See Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). However, the cases in which the court has used the test all
seem to involve the Blockburger situation of multiple count convictions at a single trial.
72. It is likewise claimed that the Supreme Court has given credence to the "same
transaction" test. See, In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889) (semble). In Nielsen, the Court
held that an initial conviction precluded prosecution even for a second crime which required
proof of different elements than were required in the first trial, since the illegal conduct was
essentially the same.
Whatever may be the import of prior decisions of the Court, it is the present Court
membership that will likely decide the issue. Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall favor
the "same transaction" test. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
joined by Douglas, J. and Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun, though not on the
Court at the time of the Ashe decision, wrote the opinion for the Eighth Circuit Court
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Does acquittal of a substantive crime prevent conviction for a conspir-
acy to commit the crime78 or for a lesser included offense? 74 After a suc-
cessful habeas corpus proceeding, is the prosecution free, because of the
civil nature of the habeas proceeding, to relitigate in a second prosecu-
tion the issues decided in defendant's favor in the habeas proceeding? 75
The reason such issues raised by the plea of double jeopardy are so
greatly varied and highly refined by a large body of case law is simply
that double prosecutions are by no means a rarity. No state or federal
prosecuting arm has evidenced the least shyness in attempting a second
prosecution where the first aborted, failed entirely or failed to produce a
satisfactory sentence.
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of Appeals, using language that seemed to approve the "same evidence" test. Any ambiguity
in Justice Blackmun's position was removed by his dissent in Harris v. Washington,
404 U.S. 55 (1971), wherein he not only expressed disagreement with the "same transac-
tion" theory, but also disagreed with the Court's holding in Ashe. The Chief Justice,
as indicated in Ashe, currently favors the "same evidence" test. 397 U.S. at 461 (dis-
senting opinion). Though he was a member of the Ashe Court, Justice White must be
ranked as unannounced. He joined the majority in Ashe that failed to use the same
transaction test as the basis for its decision, but he also declined to join Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion which expressly rejected the "same transaction" test. Justices Rehnquist
and Powell have not yet spoken on the issue.
The Court's division, as well as its patience in selecting the right case for defining the
"same offense" was sharpened in its decision in Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973). The
majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist held Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970) to be
fully retroactive. All state prosecutions are barred after a municipal prosecution for the
same offense. Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall agreed with the retroactive aspect of
the decision, but dissented from the majority's remand as to whether the three municipal
assault and battery counts were the same offense as the three state counts of assault with
intent to commit murder. This perception of an "issue" concerning the "same offense"
question by Justices Rehnquist, White and Powell, portends their narrow definition of the
issue, if not their express acceptance of the "same evidence" as opposed to the "same transac-
tion" test. Subsequently, when the Waller case was returned to the Florida court on remand,
the double jeopardy plea was rejected on the grounds that the two prosecutions did not
involve the same offense.
73. Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948). Res judicata prevented a trial on a
substantive charge of fraud after acquittal of a conspiracy to commit the fraud.
74. In Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970), defendant was tried for murder but
convicted of the lesser included offense of manslaughter. On appeal, the conviction was
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. He was tried again for murder but was
convicted in the second trial only of manslaughter. Nevertheless, the Court held that he
could not be retried for murder because of the "implicit acquittal" (Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184 (1957)) of the murder charge. Even though in Green the defendant was con-
victed of the greater charge, not the lesser one as in Price, the Court held that it made no
difference since the potential risk of conviction was protected by the double jeopardy
clause. See also Spidle v. State, 446 S.W.2d 793 (Mo. 1969). Contra, Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964); Jackson v. Follette, 462 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1972).
75. See Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426 (1923). There the Court stated: "A judgment in
habeas corpus proceedings ... may operate as res judicata. But the judgment is res judicata
only that he was at the time illegally in custody, and of the issues of law and fact necessarily
involved in that result." Id. at 430. The issue has not been decided by the Supreme Court
and current state practice is to relitigate issues decided by federal habeas corpus courts.
See Note, Constitutional Collateral Estoppel: A Bar to Relitigation of Federal Habeas
Decisions, 80 YALE L.J. 1229, 1231 (1971).
76. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 477 (1970). After defendant was acquitted of
robbing one of several members of a poker game, the prosecutor simply sharpened up his
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B. The "Same Offense"
The leading issue on which the Justices are currently split is a funda-
mental one: does the bar of double prosecution for the "same offense"
mean that the defendant can be prosecuted only once for the same crimi-
nal "transaction" or that he cannot be prosecuted twice with the same
"evidence"? The initial report of the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws (the "Brown Commission"), after prolonged study
made an attempt to codify a rule barring subsequent prosecutions for "the
same offense," which it defined as a prosecution "based upon the same
facts as the former prosecution."77 The report conceded that "[f]ederal
case law is far from clear at present as to what constitutes 'the same of-
fense' for double jeopardy purposes. ' '78 In what is at least an oversim-
plification, the Brown Commission Report claimed that its rule extended
double jeopardy protection well beyond the existing protection, which
"applies only when offenses are 'identical.' ,,79 Some court applications of
the same evidence test have been so rigid, in fact, that for all practical
purposes, the result is just what the Brown Commission stated-short of
an "identical" offense, double jeopardy offered no protection. 0 However,
under the broader "same transaction" test, some lower courts now bar a
second prosecution though it is neither "identical" to nor based solely
upon the "same evidence""' as the initial prosecution. Spurred on by the
persuasive endorsement of Mr. Justice Brennan, 2 the "same transac-
tion" test is gaining acceptance. 3 If ultimately accepted by the Supreme
Court, it would clearly extend double jeopardy protection beyond the
identical offense to include any other definable offense occurring within
the same criminal episode.
evidence and tried again in a prosecution for the second victim. The Court realized that, if
allowed, this is what "every good attorney would do ......
77. REPORT oF THE NATIONAL COMM'ISSION ON REFORm OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS
§ 703 (comment) [hereinafter referred to as the Brown Commission].
78. Id. at § 705 (comment).
79. Id.
80. See People v. Kernanen, 178 Colo. 234, 497 P.2d 8 (1972).
81. The same evidence test is said to have its origin in The King v. Vandercomb, 168
Eng. Rep. 455, 461 (Crown 1796), quoted in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 451 (1970). Even
the same evidence test permits prosecution for two offenses only if one "requires" proof of
a fact which the other does not. However, the prosecution will not be successful merely
because a piece of evidence is deemed "admissible" at a second trial after having been ruled
inadmissible at the first trial. Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55 (1971).
82. The "same transaction" test was recently adopted by the Michigan Court of
Appeals, which ruled that where defendant had already been convicted of rape and assault,
he could not be separately prosecuted for the kidnapping of the victim since they were all
part of a single course of criminal conduct, namely, the abduction and asportation of the
defendant from the suburbs to a location in Detroit where she was raped. People v. White,
41 Mich. App. 370, 200 N.W.2d 326 (1972); accord, 262 Ore. 442, 497 P.2d 1191 (1972) (a
defendant who had been convicted of the misdemeanor of carrying a concealed weapon
could not thereafter be prosecuted for the felony of possessing a gun).
83. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448 (1970) (concurring opinion). The three con-
curring justices-Brennan, Douglas and Marshall-are still on the Court.
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C. Can Evidence of a Prior Conviction Amount to Double Jeopardy?
The history of the use of impeachment and similar crimes evidence
has convinced the Supreme Court that the purpose in some of the cases
that have come before the Court is merely to blacken the image of the
defendant rather than to establish a probative logical nexus between the
indictment and the other crime. 84 Despite the lip service paid by all juris-
dictions to the rule that other crimes are inadmissible to show a disposi-
tion to crime or a propensity for evil, a fair evaluation of the history of
the rule shows that very few courts and almost no prosecutors have re-
sisted the temptation to show the jury one or more prior crimes if at all
similar to the charge in issue.85 Thus, even if the "same transaction" test
is adopted it may still be too little to prevent the normal usage of prior
offenses evidence in most criminal prosecutions.
However, there may be many cases where sensational features of the
prior offenses evidence are coupled with a weak charge or when heavy at-
tention is paid to the prior offense at trial which violate even the strictest
double jeopardy test.
D. The Manner of Using Other Offenses
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
recently reversed a conviction where a testifying defendant on trial for
robbery was asked about his prior robbery conviction in such a way as to
suggest a propensity for stealing. Though the conviction was deemed ad-
missible, the court condemned the "manner in which the evidence was
adduced."8 The Fourth Circuit has criticized the spending of excessive
trial time on other crimes evidence and has issued an unmistakable warn-
ing to prosecutors that "lavish treatment" of such evidence would pro-
duce reversals.87
84. State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1972). See also Loper v. Beto, 405
U.S. 473, 482 n.l (1972); United States v. Mastrotatoro, 455 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1972).
85. See Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1948) where, in a rape case a
similar rape offense was introduced despite the absence of any logical reason for showing it.
The prosecution offered it as relevant to "identity." Yet the defendant admitted he had
perpetrated the act, but claimed consent. Thus, no identity issue was present.
Similarity, in many cases, actually militates against admission of such offenses unless
"handiwork" is the logic for admission. One court has observed that the very similarity of
another offense has an especially prejudicial effect. The similarity "can only serve to increase
'the inevitable pressure on lay jurors to believe that if he did it before he probably did so
this time'." Accord, Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (opinion
of Judge Burger (now Chief Justice)); United States v. Bussey, 432 F.2d 1330, 1333, n.7
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (dictum) ; United States v. Hildreth, 387 F.2d 328, 329 (4th Cir. 1967).
86. United States v. Carter, 482 F.2d 738, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
87. United States v. Mastrotatoro, 455 F.2d 802, 804 (4th Cir. 1972). The same judge
shortly thereafter repeated the warning in United States v. Baldivid, 465 F.2d 1277 (4th
Cir. 1972) (Sobeloff, J., dissenting). "Since the publication of Mastrotatoro, this frail
precedent has apparently been given a vigorous workout by prosecuting attorneys who, in
my view, have failed to take full cognizance of that opinion's limiting language and restricted
scope." Id. at 1290.
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Admission of another crime even remotely like the one in issue gen-
erally will produce an easy conviction, as such evidence is more than
prejudicial. Evidence of recidivism in virtually any form is almost inevi-
tably dispositive. Leaving such matters to prosecutorial discretion is trans-
parently unsound, 8  since prosecutors have the same personal desire to
win cases as other lawyers, and hence, tend to use evidence of similar
offenses to appeal to the fears a juror feels when faced with a proven
criminal character.
E. The Use of Unrealistic Evidentiary Hypotheses
Spending excessive trial time on prior offenses is less frequently a
problem than the concocting of an unrealistic issue to which a prior of-
fense is said to be relevant. The list of hypotheses contained, for example,
in the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence that will in the future, if
adopted, justify use of a prior crime is so general that the prior crimes rule
can now scarcely be termed an "exception" to an exclusionary rule. 9 Al-
though the Fourth Circuit ° has come to that conclusion in advance of
any formal rules of evidence, the other ten circuits have not. The under-
lying definition of relevancy 9' in the proposed rules is so expansive that
it is difficult to glean from the rules themselves any limit on the admis-
sibility of a prior crime, though hopefully some limit was intended.92
The classic rationale of relevancy justifying admission of a prior
crime is the handiwork or distinctive pattern crime (often called a "sig-
nature" crime) which exists only in rare cases and relates almost entirely
to the issue of identity. 3 Cautioning that the vague rules allowing evi-
88. Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) observed
with reference to the numerous charges a prosecutor might bring based on the same conduct
that this, too, was a matter not to be left to the whim of the prosecutor: "[Gliven our
tradition of virtually unreviewable prosecutorial discretion concerning the initiation and
scope of a criminal prosecution, the potentialities for abuse inherent in the 'same evidence'
test are simply intolerable." Id. at 452.
89. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). One court has observed that the exceptions
are so numerous that "it is difficult to tell whether the doctrine or the acknowledged ex-
ceptions are the more extensive." United States v. Deaton, 381 F.2d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1967).
Even the fact that an appeal is pending will not be an obstacle to using a trial conviction as
impeachment. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 609(e). Contra, Campbell v. United States, 176 F.2d
45, 46-7 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
90. United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973).
91. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 601 provides: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." (em-
phasis added).
92. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 403 provides that: "Although relevant, evidence is not
admissible if its probative value is substantially out-weighed by the danger of unfair prej-
udice . . . ." Rule 404(a) provides: "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith
on a particular occasion . . . ." It is this exclusionary rule to which the other crimes rule
began merely as an exception.
93. See United States v. Bobbitt, 450 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v.
Bussey, 432 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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dence of prior crimes "should not be applied by rote," Judge Sobeloff has
written that the handiwork exception applies if the prior crime and the
one in issue fit a "pattern which is uniquely the defendant's."N Yet this
rarely found criterion has mushroomed into a general doctrine which may
soon become codified in the broadest possible terms that would enable
prosecutors to justify the admission of a prior crime on even the most
transparent pretexts of relevancy. What must rank as the classic pretext
is the rape case in which intercourse by the defendant was not disputed,
but the defense claimed "consent." Nevertheless, the trial court per-
mitted evidence of a prior rape to prove "identity."9' 5 The court of ap-
peals charitably labeled the identity justification an "unrealistic hypothe-
sis" and reversed.90
The common use of such unrealistic hypotheses strongly militates at
the very least in favor of a rule requiring that introduction of other crimes
evidence await the raising of a genuine dispute by the defendant over the
vehicle issue.97 But a fair and responsible appellate administration of the
present rules relating to so-called similar offenses would require even
more.
A start toward a tighter approach was recently made by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, when it
ruled that other crimes evidence raised an issue of "fundamental fairness
and justice of the trial itself" and should not be handled merely as a rule
of evidence.98 Generic similarity between the offenses (admission of prior
Dyer Act convictions in a Dyer Act prosecution) was not sufficient to
satisfy the handiwork requirement. The court stated: "The lack of show-
ing of a common plan, scheme, design or intent is of itself a fatal defi-
ciency here." 99
The dramatic or lavish use of arguably relevant prior similar crimes,
as well as the moderate use of irrelevant but potentially fatal evidence of
a prior crime, is indeed fundamentally unfair. Plainly due process is
denied in some instances. But worse than general prejudice, where the
instant charge is an exceedingly weak one and the prior crime actually
serves to tip the scales, the defendant has, in reality, been prosecuted
twice for the prior crime. However, the relative impact of evidence relating
to the indictment and to prior crimes is virtually immeasurable and has,
therefore, been left to the trial judge's subjective view of the prejudicial
impact of the prior crime.
94. United States v. Baldivid, 465 F.2d 1277, 1287 (4th Cir. 1972) (separate opinion).
95. Lovely v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 619 (E.D.S.C. 1948).
96. Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 391 (4th Cir. 1948).
97. The use of such evidence is limited to rebuttal under some circumstances. See United
States v. Bussey, 432 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
98. United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201, 205 (10th Cir. 1972) (en banc).
99. Id. at 208.
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F. Justice Brennan and De Facto Double Jeopardy
The number of trials which are in reality prosecutions for previous
offenses has been considered by the Supreme Court. In Bartkus v. Illi-
nois,100 after an acquittal in federal court, the defendant was convicted
in state court. Though the Supreme Court upheld the conviction, Justice
Brennan called the state prosecution, in reality, a second federal prosecu-
tion.' O' By the same token, if the second prosecution is for a different
offense, but the evidence is weak, and the second prosecutor succeeds in
making the case by use of evidence of a dramatic prior offense, clearly
some fundamental right is violated. But what right? If the principal
charge is extremely weak in comparison to an ostensibly relevant prior
offense, there would seem to be little difference between the "guise" of a
state prosecution used as cover for a second federal trial and the guise of
the use of persuasive prior crimes evidence to convict in a weak case. Col-
lateral estoppel, discussed infra, would be of no assistance since the prior
determination by conviction was unfavorable.0 2 Rather the pure double
jeopardy bar would seem to be the only basis for preventing such prosecu-
tions. Prosecutors now have little reason to fear any adverse consequences
of lavish use of other crimes evidence. Until the shield of "harmless error"
gives way to the presumptive prejudice connected with error of constitu-
tional magnitude, 03 the use of other crimes evidence will continue in a
steadily increasing degree.
Such de facto analysis of the role of the prior prosecution in bring-
ing about a second conviction is highly appropriate in many cases. How-
ever difficult it might be to perform, such an analysis may well lead
in many cases to the conclusion that the defendant has in reality endured
double jeopardy for and been convicted on the strength of the prior crime.
When the prior "crime" is conduct of which defendant was acquitted,
the jury may also be seduced by the added temptation to correct the
wrong that occurred when the culprit slipped through the law's grasp the
last time. This bizarre and troublesome use of a prior offense of which
defendant was acquitted also raises one of the most intriguing of all con-
stitutional questions.
100. 359 U.S. 121 (1959) [hereinafter referred to as Bartkus].
101. 359 U.S. at 165-66 (dissenting opinion). Bartkus was acquitted in federal court in
December. Then in early January a meeting was held in the United States Attorney's office
to which the Assistant State's Attorney for Cook County was invited. The state prosecution
planned there resulted in a conviction. Justice Brennan stated that the Court's task was to
determine how much the federal authorities must participate in a state prosecution "before
it so infects the conviction that we must set it aside." Id. at 168. He characterized the state
prosecution as "actually a second federal prosecution" merely in the "guise" of a state
prosecution. If the conviction were not overturned, he thought, there would be no restraints
on "the use of state machinery by federal officers to bring what is in effect a second federal
prosecution." Id.
102. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 459 n.13 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
103. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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X. CONSTITUTIONAL COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
In 1971, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed a federal conviction obtained in part by the use of evidence of a
similar offense of which a defendant had been acquitted by a state court
jury.1°4 Clinging to what the Supreme Court has called the "anachronism"
of dual sovereignty as its justification, the circuit court noticeably hedged
its approval of the use of such an "offense," stating that the record below
was inadequate to demonstrate the precise grounds of the state acquittal.
Additionally, the court expressed awareness and even a hint of apprecia-
tion of the persuasive literature predicting the abandonment of the dual
sovereignty rule, but deferred to the Supreme Court for such a ruling.108
Other courts have indicated, at least in dicta, that an acquittal would not
stop admission of the episode as a prior criminal act.1 6
A. Double Prosecutions for the "Same Offense"
The Supreme Court has sanctioned second prosecutions after both
convictions" 7 and acquittals.0 8 And it is that same route and rationale by
which the Court sanctioned such prosecutions that has led lower federal
courts to permit the evidentiary use of acquittals as criminal acts. 09 Ben-
ton v. Maryland"° forbade retrial of an accused in a state court for the
same offense of which he was acquitted at a previous trial in the state
court. Successive prosecutions by one federal court after a prior federal
trial for the "same offense" have long been held impermissible."'
B. Dual Sovereignty
Where different sovereigns attempt successive prosecutions, how-
ever, even the "identical" act could be prosecuted based on the very
''same evidence." No constitutional bar of any sort exists under current
104. United States v. Smith, 446 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1971).
105. Id. at 202 n.11.
106. United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also II J. WiOmoRF,
EvmExNcE, § 317 at 218 and n.4 (3d ed. 1940). Courts suggest that an acquittal is something
that should at least be heavily weighed before a prior "offense" is admitted in evidence, but
the fact of acquittal is not conclusive. United States v. Smith, 446 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1971) ;
United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Acts that do not in fact con-
stitute an offense, however, are not admissible. Haywood v. United States, 268 F. 795, 806
(7th Cir. 1920). Also, evidence of arrests, without more, is not admissible. Michelson v.
United States, 335 U.S. 469, 482 (1948). See also note 26 supra.
It is preferable to have the trial judge determine out of the jury's presence whether the
proof shows that defendant was connected with the other crime by "clear and convincing
evidence" before allowing the jury to hear the details. United States v. Bussey, 432 F.2d
1330, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (dictum).
107. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
108. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
109. United States v. Smith, 446 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1971).
110. 395 U.S. 784 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as Benton].
111. See Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907).
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case law. The Supreme Court held in Bartkus that an acquittal in a fed-
eral court does not preclude a retrial in a state court and in Abbate v.
United States,"2 that a conviction in a state court does not bar a federal
trial on the same facts.
Only a party to a judgment is bound by that judgment." 3 Thus,
when a state loses in its attempt to convict a defendant, the federal gov-
ernment, not having been a party to the loss, is not bound by it. More-
over, since the federal and state governments are different sovereigns with
different policies and interests of their common citizens to protect, to
cheat the federal government out of its right to relitigate that loss in fed-
eral court, it is said, emasculates the sovereign power of that government.
Until recently, it was even possible to try and convict a defendant
in a municipal or city court and then try him again for a felony in the
state court for the identical act. Then, in Waller v. Florida,"4 the Su-
preme Court held that the "dual sovereignty" rule it followed earlier was
an "anachronism" when applied to states and municipalities and reversed
a conviction based on a state prosecution which followed a conviction
based on the same matter by a municipality. In Waller the state attempted
through reliance on Bartkus and Abbate to justify the second prosecution
on grounds of dual sovereignty. It argued that the relationship between
a municipality and the state is analogous to the relationship between a
state and the federal government. The analogy was rejected.
C. How Dual Sovereignty Spreads to Other Crimes Evidence
Even in advance of a rule preventing a second sovereign from pros-
ecuting a defendant separately for the same act, dual sovereignty is clearly
inapplicable as a policy justification when one jurisdiction seeks to intro-
duce as evidence an episode that resulted in an acquittal in a different
jurisdiction. The right of the second jurisdiction to prosecute offenses
perpetrated against itself is in no way vitiated by barring such evidence
since the prior offense is seldom also an offense against that second sov-
ereign. In the rare case where the forum jurisdiction might also have had
jurisdiction to prosecute, such as for an offense which violates both state
and federal law, failure to prosecute waives the objection. Plainly, these
concepts are of highly dubious validity, for the result they produce is
anomalous. Conduct for which a defendant was acquitted should never
be used against him as a prior crime.
D. The Double Jeopardy Cases
Ashe v. Swenson,115 which raised collateral estoppel to constitutional
stature was a landmark decision, but it would be a mistake to think that
112. 359 U.S. 187 (1959) [hereinafter referred to as Abbate].
113. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMEWNTS §§ 83, 85 (1942).
114. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Waller].
115. 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (hereinafter refered to as Ashe].
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the doctrine has its most important application in the multi-victim crime
situation involved in that case. In fact, in creating constitutional collat-
eral estoppel, the Court sacrificed an opportunity to bar second prosecu-
tions on grounds of due process and double jeopardy, which concepts are
equally as narrow and judicially restrained as collateral estoppel. Due
process and double jeopardy were clearly far more appropriate grounds
for disposing of the multi-victim situation in Ashe. Why then did the
Court strain to avoid the due process ground for decision, and create in-
stead an entirely new constitutional doctrine of collateral estoppel, ap-
plicable to a far greater variety of fact situations?
The answer lies in a decision only 12 years prior to Ashe. In Hoag
v. New Jersey," 6 a divided Supreme Court refused to reverse a convic-
tion under facts virtually identical to Ashe. The court struggled with the
issue whether the second prosecution for the simultaneous robbery of a
second victim violated due process, but upheld the conviction. Then, in
1969, Benton paved the way for the decision in Ashe by holding that the
fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy was applicable to the
states. A year later when Ashe came before the Court, it was a simple
matter to rely on the double jeopardy tool provided by Benton and avoid
overruling its recent Hoag decision. It was far easier to fashion a sound
rule by elevating collateral estoppel to constitutional stature." 7
However, there can be little doubt after a careful reappraisal of
Hoag, that the principal reason for the Court's refusal to strike down
Hoag's conviction on due process grounds was the rule of Palko v. Con-
necticut"8 that the double jeopardy concept was not so fundamental that
it applied to the states. But in 1969, the Court expressly overruled Palko
when it decided Benton.19 While it declined to overrule Hoag on the due
process issue, Benton cut the very heart out of Hoag. Later, in deciding
Ashe, the Court again concluded it was no longer necessary to reach the
due process issue of Hoag, but held, on facts which were conceded to be
"virtually identical"'10 to those in Hoag, that the double jeopardy clause
was an absolute bar to the second prosecution, foregoing the chance and
116. 356 U.S. 464 (1958) [hereinafter referred to as Hoag].
117. In United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916), the Court held that federal
law recognizes in criminal cases the principle of collateral estoppel. In Hoag v. New Jersey,
356 U.S. 464, 471 (1958), the Court entertained grave doubts, despite the widespread employ-
ment of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, whether the doctrine can be regarded as a con-
stitutional requirement. In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), the Court held that it was
a constitutional requirement.
118. 302 U.S. 319 (1937) [hereinafter referred to as Palko].
119. In Benton, the Court said (395 U.S. 784 at 794): "[Wle today find that the double
jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in our con-
stitutional heritage, and that it should apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Insofar as it is inconsistent with this holding, Palko v. Connecticut is overruled." 395
U.S. at 794.
120. 397 U.S. at 441.
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avoiding the need to re-examine the fairness issues of due process. 121 Thecourt said that:
[T]he question is no longer whether collateral estoppel is a re-
quirement of due process, but whether it is a part of the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy. And if collat-
eral estoppel is embodied in that guarantee, then its applicabil-
ity in a particular case is no longer a matter to be left for state
court determination, within the broad bounds of "fundamental
fairness," but a matter of constitutional fact .... 122
E. Erosion of Separate State Sovereignty
The sovereign barriers between the prosecutorial jurisdiction of state
and federal governments are becoming increasingly difficult to find. In
many cases the federal government stands in the shoes of the state gov-
ernment, or has a near identical aim in prosecuting. Statutes prohibiting
the use of the mails to defraud,12 theft of goods from an interstate ship-
ment, 24 the use of interstate facilities to promote an activity illegal under
state law,' 25 and interstate transportation of women for immoral pur-
poses, 26 all involve federal prosecutions on behalf of state interests or sit-
uations where the state's practical ability to prosecute successfully is
doubtful. Likewise, in wiretapping, 27 kidnapping, 28 and other areas,129
the federal government has pre-empted the field and represents not only
121. Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 57 (1971), said
he disagreed with the elevation of collateral estoppel to a constitutional guarantee, but
could have understood a square overruling of Iloag.
122. 397 U.S. at 442-43. See also Erickson, The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, in
2 CREXmAL DEmEisE TECmqIQuES § .08 at App. 23 (Bernstein ed. 1973).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. 1973).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 2117 (1970).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970), as amended, 18 U.S.C. (b), (c) (Supp. 1973).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1970).
127. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1970).
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. 1973).
129. While federal jurisdiction has been broadened tremendously in recent years, it is
about to undergo an even further dramatic expansion. The proposed Federal Criminal Code,
introduced January 4, 1973, S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), adds major new definitions of
federal jurisdiction which will create many more instances of overlap between possible state
and federal prosecutions. Section 1-1A4(2) of the draft bill introduces a concept of "piggy
back" jurisdiction which provides federal jurisdiction for any offense committed in the
course of committing a federal crime or while fleeing from that act. See Liebmann, Chartering
A National Police Force, 56 A.B.A.J. 1070 (1970). Federal jurisdiction is also broadened by
§ 1-1A4(3) to include any offense which "affects commerce, directly or indirectly . . . ." If
property which is the subject of an offense is property "moving in interstate . . . commerce"
or if the offense involves "movement of any person across a state or United States boundary"
either during commission of or flight from the offense, or if an interstate facility is used in
connection with the iftense or the flight, federal jurisdiction attaches under § 1-IA4(12).
Federal jurisdiction exists under § 1-1A4(2) for offenses connected with property which is
owned by or in the custody or control of the United States, or which is being manufactured
or stored for the United States. And any offense connected with a building owned or leased
to the United States or involving a program which is receiving federal financial assistance
comes within federal jurisdiction under § I-1A4(58) of the proposed criminal code.
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itself but also the state. Under these circumstances it is unsound to speak
of the state and federal roles in prosecutions as dual sovereigns, for the
dual sovereign rationale can be employed in a number of ways. An un-
successful state prosecution for a morals offense can be followed by a pros-
ecution under the Mann Act for the interstate transportation of the
woman even if the entire episode is a brief tryst. Only by treating the two
governments as separate sovereigns could a plea of double jeopardy be
prevented. Yet the underlying rationale is contrary to the rationale used
60 years ago to sustain the validity of the Mann Act when the Court said:
Our dual form of government has its perplexities.., but it must
be kept in mind that we are one people ...and the powers
[granted to the federal government] are adapted to be exercised,
whether independently or concurrently, to promote the general
welfare .... 130
Moreover, dual sovereignty is supported by the shakiest of prece-
dent. The authorities relied upon by the Court in Bartkus and Abbate
have been widely questioned.'' After the government won the Abbate
case, the Attorney General quickly announced a policy highly restrictive
of subsequent federal prosecutions. 3 '
Ironically, even the precepts of international law do not appear to
support that position. An acquittal in one country can be pleaded as a bar
in another country.' If the dual sovereignty concept is an "anachro-
nism""3 4 as between state and local governments, it is no less anachro-
nistic as applied to state and federal governments. Unquestionably, fur-
ther procedures are needed to assure that where peculiarly federal or
state purposes are present, they will be fairly represented in a prosecu-
tion. Numerous solutions have been proposed, such as joint trials of state
and federal charges. Some of these solutions are better than others, but
all are most certainly better than perpetuating the concept of dual sov-
ereignty and the tradition of tolerable double jeopardy which it nourishes.
Even the abandoned attempt of the Brown Commission to frame a
rule under which prosecution by one jurisdiction would bar prosecution
by the federal government 3 offered some worthy concepts. The proposal
would have recognized that a prosecution in another jurisdiction would
prevent prosecution by the federal government under some circumstances
130. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322 (1913).
131. Schaefer, Unresolved Issues in the Law of Double Jeopardy: Waller and Ashe, 58
CA in. L. REv. 391, 400 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Schaefer]. See also Franck, An Inter-
national Lawyer Looks at the Bartkus Rule, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 1096 (1959); Grant, Succes-
sive Prosecutions by State and Nation: Common Law and British Empire Comparisons, 4
U.C.LA.L. Rav. 1 (1956); Pontikes, Dual Sovereignty and Double Jeopardy: A Critique of
Bartkus v. Illinois and Abbate v. United States, 14 W. REs. L. REv. 700 (1963).
132. N.Y. Times, April 6, 1959, at 1, col. 4 (city ed.).
133. Cf. United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 86 (1820).
134. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970). See also Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S.
333 (1907).
135. See Schaefer, supra note 129.
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-a considerable improvement on Abbate. If the subsequent federal pros-
ecution were based on the same conduct or arose from the same criminal
episode as the prior prosecution, it would be barred, under the Brown
Commission's proposal unless the state law under which the defendant
was tried was "intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil"
from the federal offense.18 0 Obviously a better definition is necessary since
the argument could always be made that the federal statute relates to
some different evil. Furthermore, the Brown Commission's concept was
fundamentally insufficient since it would have made such prosecutions,
ultimately, a matter of prosecutorial discretion rather than constitutional
right. The Attorney General would have been permitted to certify, in ex-
ceptional cases, that the interests of the United States would be unduly
harmed if the federal prosecution were barred and, thus, could have de-
feated entirely the bar of double jeopardy.1 7
Any solution that makes double jeopardy protection depend on pros-
ecutorial discretion, or on the application of a poorly articulated stan-
dard, comparing the goals of the federal and state statutes is unsatisfac-
tory.1 8 New trial procedures that will permit a single prosecution are
needed to deal with those instances when both sovereigns have compelling
reasons for prosecuting a defendant for the same criminal episode. The
jurisdiction of federal courts should be expanded to include pendent juris-
diction over the state crime. Expansion of state court jurisdiction to give
it pendent jurisdiction to try the federal crime along with the state crime
clearly presents greater problems of constitutionality, uniformity and
policy. Wherever possible, however, the prosecutions should proceed to-
gether, or the second try should be barred. The defendant should face the
full jeopardy for his crime and be exposed to both state and federal
punishment where the two have unique interests, but he should endure it
136. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFoRwr OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS
§§ 704-05 (comment). See Erickson, The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, in 2 CRimiNAL
DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § .08 at App-23 (Bernstein ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Erickson],
which discusses the proposals contained in the Model Penal Code and in the ABA's Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice relating to joinder of offenses. Both adopt the position that
a defendant should be protected against successive prosecution for the same conduct. The
ABA Standards adopt the procedure of permitting a defendant who has been charged with
two or more offenses to move that they be joined for trial or, after an unsuccessful joinder
motion and after being tried for one of the offenses, the defendant would then be permitted
to move to dismiss any other closely related offense.
137. RFxoRM OF FEDERAL CRiMaNAL LAWS, HEARINGS BEFORE SUBCOMMITTz ON CRIMINAL
LAWS AND PROCEDURES, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
138. The task of determining such similarity under federal and state statutes was
termed "a difficult one," even 14 years ago. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 138 (1959).
The next 14 years proved it almost impossible as attested to by the Brown Commission's
capitulation. Some 27 states have refused to recognize a former prosecution in another juris-
diction as a bar. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 134 (1959). Presently, very few federal
statutes recognize the bar of a prosecution in another jurisdiction. But see 18 U.S.C. § 2117
(1970), which is one of a rare breed of federal statutes prohibiting a federal prosecution for
burglary of a vehicle carrying an interstate shipment after prosecution for the same conduct
by a state.
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only once. Even the Brown Commission's legislative solutions were aban-
doned,189 however, and any solutions are for now left to the courts.
F. The Dissents of Mr. Justice Black
What was said of the dual sovereignty rule in the context of local
and state prosecutions is equally applicable to successive state and fed-
eral prosecutions. In Waller, Justice Black stated that even the state and
federal governments should not be viewed as separate sovereigns for the
purpose of justifying successive prosecutions. 1 0 In his decade of double
jeopardy dissents,"4 Justice Black repeated several times and supported
with scholarly historical analysis four themes which may yet prevail:
First, double jeopardy must be viewed from the perspective of the rights
of the defendant rather than the purported sovereign rights of the prose-
cuting authority; 4 2 second, the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal
cases is not to be applied with rigid technical adherence to rules applied
in civil cases;148 third, retrials after a prior acquittal have been viewed
throughout legal history as being especially obnoxious and offensive to
fundamental concepts of fairness; 144 and fourth, application of the bar of
double jeopardy should not be left to subjective notions of what is fair
but should be an absolute bar to a second trial for the same offense.4
The inroads made recently by lower courts in the outmoded concepts so
long and so solidly opposed by Justice Black are quite dramatic. His im-
pact on the development of the concepts of double jeopardy and estoppel,
though almost entirely in dissent, is clearly historic.
One state supreme court, embracing this philosophy, has announced
that it will no longer tolerate successive federal and state prosecutions for
139. Sections 704-08 relating to the bar of a former prosecution were eliminated from
the Senate bill prior to introduction. S. 1, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
140. 397 U.S. at 395 (separate opinion).
141. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150 (1959); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S.
187, 201 (1959); Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571, 575 (1958). See also Greene v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
142. Justice Black, speaking of the dual sovereignty justification for a double prosecu-
tion, said:
Looked at from the standpoint of the individual who is being prosecuted, this notion
is too subtle for me to grasp. If the double punishment is what is feared, it hurts
no less for two "Sovereigns" to inflict it than for one. If danger to the innocent is
emphasized, that danger is surely no less when the power of State and Federal
Governments is brought to bear on one man in two trials, than when one of these
"Sovereigns" proceeds alone. In each case, inescapably, a man is forced to face
danger twice for the same conduct.
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 155 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
143. Id. In at least one context this view had been adopted by the Court. Speaking of
the technique to be followed in determining what facts were finally determined in a prior
case, the Court said in Ashe that in criminal cases, the rule of collateral estoppel should not
be applied with the "hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading
book .... " Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970).
144. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 162 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
145. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970) (Black, J., concurring).
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the same act unless it appears that their interests are "substantially differ-
ent."' 46 This policy decision from a state court suggests that where the
Supreme Court failed to complete the breakthrough, some other less vul-
nerable tribunals are willing to pick up the standard. Still other courts,
though more reluctant to innovate where the Supreme Court balked, have
at least acknowledged that the dual sovereignty twins, Bartkus and Ab-
bate, cannot long withstand the chafing effect of decisions like Benton and
have openly predicted the abandonment of the dual sovereign rule."4 7
Absent the dual sovereignty justification, the use of evidence of a
prior offense of which defendant was acquitted violates the Ashe consti-
tutional collateral estoppel rule. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, in a habeas corpus proceeding, ruled that the introduc-
tion into evidence in a state trial of "other crimes" conduct of which the
defendant had been acquitted was prohibited by Ashe.148 In doing so, the
federal court showed no reluctance to fashion for the states a rule inter-
preting Ashe to provide that such an "evidentiary fact," once adjudicated,
is protected by the constitutional principle of collateral estoppel. The fact
that it was a federal court which ruled that a state cannot use a prior state
acquittal demonstrates the crumbling of the border between such sover-
eigns. If due process forbids the use of an invalid conviction, as the Su-
preme Court held in Loper v. Beto, 49 the use as an alleged "crime" of a
transaction for which the defendant once stood trial and was cleared is a far
more fundamental, constitutionally offensive violation of due process.
An acquittal brings to the court the additional constitutionally offensive
element of badgering the defendant with the historically most abhorred
feature of double jeopardy-the requirement that he defend himself
again after once being acquitted.'50
G. The Supreme Court's Own Erosion of Dual Sovereignty
Although not yet abandoned in all circumstances,' the dual sover-
eignty principle has suffered considerable erosion in recent years and has
been expressly abandoned by the Court in at least three situations. In
Elkins v. United States,'52 the Court ruled that evidence illegally seized
by state authorities could not be used by federal authorities; in Murphy
v. Waterfront Commissioner,58 the Court held that a grant of immunity
to a witness by a state authority barred the federal government from
146. Commonwealth v. Mills, 447 Pa. 163, 171-72, 286 A.2d 638, 642 (1971).
147. United States v. Smith, 446 F.2d 200, 203 n.1 (4th Cir. 1971).
148. Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1972).
149. 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
150. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
151. See Murray, Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Prosecutions: Time to Abandon the
Identity of Parties Rule, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 922 (1973); REPORT OF TEM NArioNAL Com-
MissixoN oN RaoPR. Or FEDERAL CRnmqAL LAWS, comment to § 704 at 61; Erickson, supra
note 136, § .08 at App. 23.
152. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
153. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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using the testimony compelled under the state's immunity grant; and
in Waller v. Florida,154 the Court most recently rejected the "dual sover-
eignty" theory calling it an "anachronism" as applied to successive prose-
cutions by a municipality and a state. Prior to these three decisions, a
second prosecution would have been allowed in each of those situations
under the dual sovereignty rule.
XI. CONCLUSION
The full impact of seemingly unrelated constitutional decisions on
grounds of due process, double jeopardy, ex post facto laws and a consti-
tutional right to testify may not be appreciated for quite some time when
appellate courts have had time to develop these issues in different contexts.
The direct impact of the Supreme Court's holding in Ashe v.
Swenson, for example, was merely to prevent repetitious attempts at
prosecution after a defendant was once acquitted of a crime against one
of several victims. However, the ripple effect of the decision was far more
significant and should ultimately produce a complete re-evaluation of the
double jeopardy, collateral estoppel and due process implications of the
use of evidence to prior offenses. Likewise, the direct impact of the court
of appeals' decision in United States v. Henson'5 5 is to outlaw retroactive
application of adverse significant statutory changes in the use of prior
crimes evidence. What these courts share in common is the determination
to treat this traditionally evidentiary and procedural question as a matter
of fundamental fairness of the trial, worthy of consideration under a
variety of constitutional provisions.
Perhaps this common theme of Henson, Loper, State v. Santiago,56
Wingate v. Wainwright'57 and other recent decisions will lead other courts
to discard the myth that prior convictions are truly used only to impeach
credibility or to bolster some other remote and unlikely issue, and will
enlighten other jurisdictions to review convictions involving prior crimes
by the standards applicable to the issues which the law's changing wisdom
ultimately comes to realize as fundamental and, therefore, of constitu-
tional stature.
154. 397 U.S. 387 (1970).
155. 486 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
156. 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1972).
157. 464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1972).
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